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ABSTRACT: The Air Force Research Laboratory, in conjunction with numerous government,
academic, professional organizations and industry, is initiating the development of a set of small
satellite standards. It is envisioned that these standards will encompass standard launch vehicle
mechanical and electrical interfaces, as well as inter-satellite mechanical, electrical and software
interfaces. The procedure that is being followed in the standards development process is to
engage the stakeholders in the small satellite community in a dialogue to determine which, if
any, of the above standards can be implemented in the near term. Those standards would then be
included in relevant future solicitations from the participating Government agencies through
Small Business Innovative Research (SBIR) and other contract vehicles.
The author believes that small satellites represent a potential disruptive technology in the
aerospace industry. However, the disruptive nature of small satellites lies in their ability to be
simpler, cheaper and more modular than larger spacecraft. In order to achieve modularity, a set
of small satellite standards needs to be developed and employed. This paper will assess the
critical path to standards development, including past examples, as well as progress to date in the
development of a set of small satellite standards.

INTRODUCTION
for
future
small
development efforts.

Overview/ Purpose
As the small satellite community undertakes a
standards development effort it is prudent to
first take a step back and examine the lessons
learned from previous standards development
efforts. This study should include specific
examples from the previous standards
development efforts (including failures and
successes), but equally important it should
include an examination of the procedure
associated with a standards development
process. The purpose of this paper is to
provide this background study as a reference
Ganley
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STANDARDS
Definition
The term ‘standard’ can have many different
meanings. It is therefore useful to precisely
define what we mean when we say ‘standard’.
In the context of this paper, a standard is a rule
or requirement that is determined by a
consensus opinion of users and that prescribes
the accepted criteria for a product, process or
procedure.6 The underlying assumption is that
the accepted criteria represents the best
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technical approach, but this is more of a
measure of success of the standards
development process than the actual standard.
In considering the concept of standards as they
relate to satellites, the goal is most often
interoperability, and a standard is the means to
that end. The benefits of interoperability are
the same for small satellites as in other
applications, most notably a reduction in total
product cost and ability for companies to
specialize.
Industry has an interest in
standards specifically because it allows for
competitive specialization. This is especially
applicable to the small satellite community,
where the vast majority of the suppliers are
specialized, with very few small companies
maintaining a broad core competency.
Standardization would allow these small
specialized companies to be more profitable.

The formal standards development process in
the United States dates back 100 years with
the formation of what is now the American
National Standards Institute (ANSI) in 1918.
In fact, standards development in the US
preceded this by a few decades with work at
the
various
professional
engineering
organizations (IEEE, ASME, ASCE, etc.).
Today, other organizations also exist in the
US and worldwide that serve the same
function (NIST, ISO, etc.). Regardless, it is
apparent that there is a significant history and
lessons learned database from which one can
draw.
Standards Process
As one begins to undertake a standards
development effort, two things quickly
become apparent: 1. While the concept of a
standard is easy to intellectually grasp (in fact
the better the standard, the easier it appears)
the implementation of a standard technically is
often very difficult. When one attempts to
develop a standard, one is moving a
significant amount of the technical work to the
front of the process. This is beneficial in the
long run because it can greatly reduce the
recurring engineering costs for a product. 2.
In spite of the fact that the technical side of
developing a standard is difficult, the process
of obtaining the standard is even more
difficult. The mechanics of a standards
development effort is estimated to consume
approximately double the resources (financial,
manpower, schedule) as compared to defining
the technical standard.

In examining standards, the best ones are
transparent to the end user – they are accepted.
This implies utility and cost effectiveness.
For completeness, standards can also serve the
purpose of safety, quality or consistency,
although these are typically not the reasons for
using standards in the satellite industry.
History
Standards have been in existence for nearly as
long as civilization. Very early examples
include the use of stones for weight standards,
and various standards for currency. In the
U.S., some of the notable early standards were
the railroad standard gage, the standard brick
size and, more recently, the adoption of
standard electrical appliance specifications.
Currently in the U.S., there are in excess of
30,000 voluntary standards, which have been
developed by more than 400 organizations.6
This represents a conservatively low number
compared to the total number of standards in
use in the U.S. today.

Ganley

Although it may not seem intuitively obvious,
the process of standards development is more
important to the final end product success than
the detailed technical inputs to the process.
This fact is clearly illustrated by the modus
operandi of each of the major standards
development organizations, which focus
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First, the USB Implementers Forum8 has a
very mature standard development process.
This can be considered completely separate
from the actual technical standard. If one
looks at the history of successful standards
development, the essential element of a
mature standards development process must
exist.

heavily on procedure vs. technical content. A
typical organizational structure is as follows
(from ISO) 4: Membership is open and on an
equal basis. Participation is voluntary, but is
most often market driven (i.e. participation is
often the result of market forces). In other
cases (i.e. safety), the organizational force is
mandated. For example, in the case of traffic
safety standards (e.g. traffic markings and
signage). In the end, consensus is the primary
end goal of the process with a required
mechanism for negative opinions and
resolution.
This is noteworthy in the
aerospace industry, which is not typically
noted for its high degree of cooperation.

Second, the USB standard is being advanced
by Intel, Microsoft, Hewlett Packard, NEC
and many others. This represents a significant
market share in the PC industry. The lesson is
that critical mass matters in the successful
development and adoption of a standard. In
this regard, the small satellite community
fails.
It is the author’s opinion that
cooperation in the space community is all but
impossible, with the true cooperation required
for this level of standards development effort
non-existent.

The standards community generally agrees
that the development of standards occurs in a
competitive environment, where weaker
standards generally do not get adopted or are
supplanted by technically superior ones.
However, the drawback to this architecture is
that some standards can be promulgated by a
significant market interest, even if it is not the
best technical solution.

An interesting note on the USB standard: the
controlling documentation which defines the
technical specification is 650 pages in length.
This represents only the original specification,
not including any updates, errata, etc. This
illustrates the complexity and effort that is
involved in accomplishing the end goal of a
seamless ‘plug-and-play’ interoperability. In
addition, the USB development effort began in
1995, with a first release of the USB 2.0
standard in 2000. While the USB 1.0 standard
existed prior to 2000, one could argue that
version 2.0 represents the first non-beta
implementation of the standard.
This
reinforces the timeline advocated by the
international standards organizing bodies of 26 years for full standard implementation.4,5

SUCCESSFUL (AND UNSUCCESSFUL)
STANDARDS
A few select case studies are examined to
illustrate ‘good’ and ‘bad’ standards. One
important conclusion from this analysis is that
the technical solution is not the sole driving
factor in determining the relative success of a
given standard.
Universal Serial Bus (USB)
The Universal Serial Bus (USB) standard,
which is probably the most cited example
when one discusses the desire for standards in
small satellites, is an interesting lesson in
successful standards development.
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Ada
The Ada computer programming language
was developed by the United States
Government, specifically the Department of
Defense (DoD), in the time frame from the
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left out of the process will be very difficult to
bring into the fold at a later date. This is not
an argument to bring all conceivable
stakeholders into the standards process
immediately - this would likely lead to group
paralysis.
Clearly, achieving the correct
balance point is not a trivial solution.
However, it is possible that the small satellite
community is small enough to be able to
function towards a standards solution, but
large enough to satisfy market forces.

late 1970’s through the late 1990’s, in an
effort to standardize and thus reduce the costs
of embedded custom software development in
DoD systems.
The development effort
followed a typical systematic Government
development approach. The Ada code was
even submitted and adopted by both ANSI and
ISO in the mid 1990’s.
This example
illustrates that the standard development
process is lengthy, in this case spanning
decades.
The Ada development effort is frequently
quoted within the Government as “what not to
do”. In examining Ada from a standards
perspective, what went wrong? The Ada
development team followed the standards
development process, including adoption by
the appropriate governing bodies. However,
one thing that the Ada standards development
team failed to capture (possibly deliberately)
was the explosion in the personal computer
and associated software market. One could
probably argue that the Ada standards
development process actually worked as
originally intended (assuming that the
exclusion of the commercial software market
was deliberate). In fact, the Ada system is still
used in the security dominated Government
unique applications for which it was designed
(DoD, banking, commercial aviation). The
failure, then, is not in the programming
language standard, but in the expectations of
the onlookers who thought the system would
be universally applicable.

SMALL
SATELLITE
DEVELOPMENT
Desired Framework

As a starting point, it is helpful to lay out what
the small satellite community wants from
standards. Based on the author’s personal
experience, the most commonly evoked
comparison is between a satellite and a
personal computer. The stated goal is to
develop a satellite solution that has the desired
PC attributes: ease of use, plug-and-play
capability, component interoperability, etc.
The similarities between a PC and a typical
satellite are numerous, with the degree of
similarity significantly outstripping the
differences. This degree of similarity lends
itself to the PC / satellite analogy, making the
comparison a valid one. However, one should
be mindful of tracking the important
differences between the two, most notably the
remote, harsh environment in which a satellite
must operate, so that a fair comparison can be
made.

However, the Ada example is very useful in
illustrating that a great deal of money
(hundreds of millions of dollars) is sometimes
spent on standards development efforts, with
very little return on investment. This is
simply a function of the natural market driven
standards process. The lesson for small
satellite developers is that a standard will find
application only among those that have a
vested interest in the process. Those that are
Ganley

STANDARDS

History / Reality
Several attempts have been made in the
aerospace industry at standardization or
interoperability of satellites. In all cases, the
result was less than the original intent of a
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recent University class small satellite efforts
(PCSat, Sapphire, etc.) have adopted degrees
of standardization in their satellites,
significantly leveraging personal computer
COTS components and associated standards.
In these cases, the standard was adopted
because of a lack of resources at the
universities to develop customized solutions.
As is noted later, the true test of these systems
will not be if they are fully optimized, but if
they provide a market solution (i.e. not are
they perfect, but are they good enough).

sweeping industry-wide change. In some
cases nominal interoperability was realized for
a period of time. In other cases, the ‘standard’
died with the program. The lesson of history
is often overlooked in all fields, and
engineering is no exception. However, in this
case an important lesson should be taken from
history,
namely
that
the
standards
development process is a process, not a eureka
moment. To be successful takes dedicated
hard work and significant amounts of time.
The previous attempts at standardization in the
aerospace industry should not be seen as
failures, but instead as incremental steps
toward problem solution. If one looks at the
PC industry – our closest model – one can see
the same pattern.
Multiple attempts at
standardization have been made over time in
the PC industry, with varying degrees of
success at each step. In fact, if one looks
closely at the PC architecture, it is actually a
very complex interweave of standards that
have been developed and matured over time.
The PC example appears as an integrated
simple solution to the user precisely because it
is a good standard.

Examples: Launch Vehicles
Another excellent example of standardization
in the aerospace industry is in the launch
market. Because there are relatively few
providers for space lift, the mechanical
interface for satellites (physical interface,
volume, mass) is standardized. The trade
space for the satellite designer is more or less
set by the launch vehicles, and more
importantly is widely accepted. In effect, this
results in a de-facto set of standards. If the
satellite designer cannot live within the mass
constraints of a given system, they move to
the next most capable vehicle.

One other important lesson to be learned from
the PC industry is the approximate cost of
standards development. A quick survey of the
literature puts the estimate for an average PC
standard (Ethernet or OSI, for example) at
anywhere from $10M to $500M. It is unlikely
that the R&D side of the satellite industry will
be able to garner this level of resources for a
standards development effort.

Examples: Air Force Research Laboratory
The Air Force Research Laboratory, Space
Vehicles Directorate recently began an effort
to evaluate the concept of taking terrestrial
personal computer and other COTS
components and standards and building a
functional R&D focused satellite.
Early
results from the study suggest that a capable
system can be developed to meet the R&D
satellite market needs. If this system can be
realized, several significant advantages result:

Examples: Universities
Several recent standards development efforts
have been undertaken within the university
small satellite community. One program of
note is the CubeSat effort, which has done
very well at defining a standard satellite
volume and mass, and maintaining that
standard through time. In addition, several
Ganley

1. The process of taking an R&D payload
from the lab bench to the satellite is
significantly streamlined. Most all lab
bench
setups
for
developing
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small satellite industry who intend to
undertake standards development efforts. A
few critical statements can be made about the
standards development process and should be
internalized
prior
to
undertaking
a
development effort:

experiments already utilize a PC
interface.
2. The system will be highly evolvable
over time, directly following the PC
industry as it advances.
3. The system interface will be greatly
simplified, again following the
common PC user interface and system
architecture.
4. The system cost will be significantly
reduced by utilizing high volume / low
cost COTS components. In addition,
custom interface development nonrecurring engineering (NRE) costs are
significantly reduced.

1.

2.
3.

The final results of the study are pending, but
initial trade studies suggest that a very capable
system can be assembled for very low cost.
In addition, the Air Force Research
Laboratory, Space Vehicles Directorate, under
the University Nanosatellite Program, has
undertaken the development of a series of
small satellite standardized structural busses.
The latest revision of the structural design is
designed to interface with the 15” diameter
ESPA secondary position and accommodate
the best design principles from the previous
designs (modularity, scalability, ease of
fabrication, etc.). The satellite bus structure is
considered ‘low hanging fruit’ on the potential
standards tree, and was therefore the first step
taken at AFRL in the standards process.
Interestingly, this was not the result of a
conscious effort on the part of the AFRL team,
but rather a function of the constraints
(money, personnel, etc.) and their availability
– the structure was done first because it was
the easiest, but not with malice of forethought.

4.

These factors should be considered as the
small satellite community undertakes any
standards development efforts. In the author’s
opinion, the small satellite community does
not have the inherent market in the near term
to sustain a stand alone (i.e. customized)
standards development effort. The only path
is to take developed standards from the PC
and other industries and adapt them to small
satellite use. In this regard, small satellites
have a distinct advantage over the more
traditional large satellite aerospace industry in
their flexibility to adapt to new design
paradigms.
The fundamental question in this trade is if it
makes more sense to adopt PC standards and
adjust small satellites to fit (thus leveraging
the significant capital investment of the PC

CONCLUSIONS
The purpose of this paper has been to provide
a background and perspective for those in the
Ganley

Standards development is expensive,
costing at minimum $1 million, and
easily ranging into the $100’s of
millions for large efforts.
Standards development involves both
a technical solution and a process to
reach community consensus.
Standards committee size and time to
standards development are inversely
related. This is due to organizational
complexity and the fact that standards
organizations have traditionally been
hampered by political (non-technical)
issues.
Regardless, standards
development has historically taken a
minimum of 2-6 years, depending on
the scale of the effort.
Standards development is market
driven.
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industry – literally billions of dollars for the
more common standards), or to develop
custom small satellite standards solutions. It
is the author’s opinion that the latter path is
not viable for a multitude of reasons,
including the lack of market forces, time to
product maturation, and lack of true
cooperation in the aerospace industry.

benign LEO environment. A 3GHz PC chip
costs $250, while a 250MHz space rated chip
costs $10,000. In the systems engineering
trade space the space rated chip is roughly
100,000 times as expensive for computing
power. In addition, if a paradigm could be
adopted to take advantage of the COTS PC
chip market, the R&D costs moving into the
future would be essentially covered, and the
satellite system would grow in capability very
rapidly relative to the traditional satellite
industry.

The path that the author is proposing is a
complete departure from the traditional
satellite design methodology of requirements
flow-down from a mission statement. The
current requirements flow-down process is a
logical one for a mature industry. However,
Christensen2
suggests
that
disruptive
technologies should not, by there very nature,
follow the traditional methodology, but should
instead strive to create an initial small market
solution with the capability to satisfy
traditional market needs through an inherently
advanced rate of product improvement. If
small satellites were to adopt this PC
standards paradigm, they could truly realize
their potential as a disruptive technology to
larger satellites. By hitching a ride on the
coattails of the PC industry (to which a
satellite already has significant similarities)
and adopting their standards, small satellites
can realize the significantly accelerated
performance
growth
that
disruptive
technologies must possess.
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As one example, the PC industry has seen
significant advancement in processing power
(obeying Moore’s law), while satellite
processing capability has lagged significantly.
The logical reason for this is that the
traditional satellite processors must be
radiation hardened for the space environment.
In approaching the systems engineering
problem from a different perspective, what if a
different system could be developed, say a
dual processor watchdog system in a relatively
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